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Abstract 
 
Transcendental consciousness is the principle 
of principles based on which philosophization of 
great philosophers such as Descartes and Husserl 
has been founded. With an inquiry into the 
intentional structure of this transcendental 
consciousness, Husserl accepts it just like the 
fundamental principle of philosophization and 
calls himself another New Cartesian. Descartes’ 
first principle is the thinking ego which, according 
to Husserl, has noemata in its thought. It should 
be noted that the fundamental element of his 
philosophization, i.e. "transcendental ego", is the 
same thing in an intersubjective relation to which 
all matters, including life-world and everything 
therein, are constituted. It is the same thing that 
happens with deep mining of the thoughts in the 
mind of the thinking ego and lived experience of 
consciousness fluid life. From the joining of 
monad-like egos, the first form of objectivity, i.e. 
intersubjective nature, arises. Here, my 
perception of the other and world and even 
other ego’s perception of me and my world are 
seen in the same way by identical necessity; that 
is, everyone in his own position considers 
another ego in its own position to be similar to 
himself. This means that their life-world is easily 
exchanged with each other. Ego as the 
transcendental and concrete ego experiences and 
knows other egos inside itself with certainty and 
hence, my life-world will be identical with his. 
Overall, Husserl was influenced by Descartes in 
presenting his own philosophical views. So, this 
 Resumen 
 
La conciencia trascendental es el principio de 
principios basado en el cual se ha fundado la 
filosofía de grandes filósofos como Descartes y 
Husserl. Con una investigación sobre la 
estructura intencional de esta conciencia 
trascendental, Husserl la acepta como el 
principio fundamental de la filosofización y se 
llama a sí mismo otro Nuevo cartesiano. El 
primer principio de Descartes es el yo pensante 
que, según Husserl, tiene noemata en su 
pensamiento. Debe notarse que el elemento 
fundamental de su filosofización, es decir, el "ego 
trascendental", es lo mismo en una relación 
intersubjetiva a la que están constituidas todas las 
materias, incluido el mundo de la vida y todo lo 
que está en ellas. Es lo mismo que sucede con la 
minería profunda de los pensamientos en la 
mente del ego pensante y la experiencia vivida de 
la vida fluida de la conciencia. A partir de la unión 
de egos de tipo mónada, surge la primera forma 
de objetividad, es decir, la naturaleza 
intersubjetiva. Aquí, mi percepción del otro y del 
mundo e incluso la percepción del otro ego 
sobre mí y mi mundo se ven de la misma manera 
por idéntica necesidad; es decir, todos en su 
propia posición consideran que otro ego en su 
propia posición es similar a él. Esto significa que 
su mundo de la vida se intercambia fácilmente 
entre sí. El ego como el ego trascendental y 
concreto experimenta y conoce otros egos en su 
interior con certeza y, por lo tanto, mi mundo de 
vida será idéntico al suyo. En general, Husserl fue 
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paper aims to investigate and analyze Cartesian 
meditations in his philosophical approaches. The 
research method is descriptive-analytical. 
 
Keyword: Transcendental ego, subjectivity, 
intersubjective relation, other ego, life-world. 
 
influenciado por Descartes al presentar sus 
propios puntos de vista filosóficos. Por lo tanto, 
este artículo tiene como objetivo investigar y 
analizar las meditaciones cartesianas en sus 
enfoques filosóficos. El método de investigación 
es descriptivo-analítico. 
 
Palabra clave: ego trascendental, 
subjetividad, relación intersubjetiva, otro ego, 
mundo de la vida. 
Resumo 
 
A consciência transcendental é o princípio de princípios baseado no qual a filosofização de grandes 
filósofos como Descartes e Husserl foi fundada. Com uma investigação sobre a estrutura intencional dessa 
consciência transcendental, Husserl a aceita exatamente como o princípio fundamental da filosofização e 
chama a si mesmo de outro novo cartesiano. O primeiro princípio de Descartes é o ego pensante que, 
segundo Husserl, tem noemata em seu pensamento. Deve-se notar que o elemento fundamental de sua 
filosofização, ou seja, "ego transcendental", é a mesma coisa em uma relação intersubjetiva à qual todas as 
matérias, incluindo o mundo da vida e tudo o que nele existe, são constituídas. É a mesma coisa que 
acontece com a mineração profunda dos pensamentos na mente do ego pensante e na experiência vivida 
da vida fluida da consciência. A partir da união de egos semelhantes a mônadas, surge a primeira forma de 
objetividade, ou seja, a natureza intersubjetiva. Aqui, minha percepção do outro e a percepção do mundo 
e até mesmo do ego de mim e do meu mundo são vistas da mesma maneira por necessidade idêntica; isto 
é, todos em sua própria posição consideram que outro ego em sua própria posição é semelhante a ele 
mesmo. Isso significa que seu mundo da vida é facilmente trocado entre si. O ego como o ego 
transcendental e concreto experimenta e conhece outros egos dentro de si com certeza e, portanto, meu 
mundo da vida será idêntico ao dele. No geral, Husserl foi influenciado por Descartes ao apresentar seus 
próprios pontos de vista filosóficos. Assim, este artigo tem como objetivo investigar e analisar as 
meditações cartesianas em suas abordagens filosóficas. O método de pesquisa é descritivo-analítico. 
 
Palavra-chave: ego transcendental, subjetividade, relação intersubjetiva, outro ego, mundo da vida. 
 
Introduction 
 
The main issue in phenomenology and 
principally in all philosophy is the search for the 
foundation and the original principle based on 
which certainty can be achieved. Descartes' first 
principle is the thinking ego which, according to 
Husserl, has noemata in its thought. The central 
point of primary humanism can be regarded as 
the existence of a sustainable and coherent self 
that benefits from freedom of will and relative 
supremacy over the outside world. In this view, 
the whole human existence is summarized in 
consciousness and Descartes proclaims "I think, 
so I am". From now on, understanding and study 
of ego becomes the fundamental goal of Western 
philosophy so that Husserl considers philosophy 
as equivalent to egology. What we find along with 
the fundamental role of "ego" in 
phenomenological thinking is that everything that 
needs existence is entitled so only in the mind of 
the transcendental ego. Therefore, opening new 
horizons of existence is conceivable while 
discovering such a transcendental ego. Husserl 
seeks to reach immortal logos and a new 
beginning by disregarding loose philosophical 
foundations; something that, in his view, happens 
in the fluid domain of consciousness. It should be 
remembered that the fundamental element of his 
philosophization, i.e. transcendental ego, is the 
same thing that constitutes in the realm of its 
mind all matters, including life-world and 
everything therein, in an intersubjective relation. 
Husserl was convinced that the subject is in the 
center of philosophy. Consequently, philosophy 
is nothing but the understanding of ego. This 
Cartesian characteristic has turned Husserl into 
one of the greatest figures of modern thought. In 
the modern age and its emerged philosophies, 
man is a thoughtful creature resulting from the 
Cartesian term "I think, so I am" (Cogito). 
 
Husserl attempts to introduce human 
intellect as a criterion for searching the 
fundamental philosophical truth. In his thinking, 
the main issue is consciousness and his purpose 
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is to equip man with a means to accurately 
understand the world of life. An emphasis on the 
phenomenological transcendental domain of self 
is due to its relation to consciousness. 
Consciousness is applied not only in the physical 
reality of the world of self but also for every 
reasonable world. In his own phenomenology, 
Husserl considers the entire world to belong to 
consciousness with its infinite form of time and 
place. This ego initially exists in a natural 
approach and is then placed in a transcendental 
approach by reflecting on self. In the Husserlian 
phenomenology, Greek Arche is considered the 
same as ego which tries to recognize other 
matters in self. From a phenomenological point 
of view, the transcendental ego is a prerequisite 
for any perception so that this ego is regarded as 
the precondition for the existence of this 
universe (objective nature). In such a position, a 
single and isolated ego cannot alone seek to 
conquer the world, but the assumption is a 
universe and life-world that results from the 
union of ego and other egos and in this way, we 
witness a common universe and life-world. By 
discovering this life-world, the realm of 
subjective phenomena which has remained 
unknown can be disclosed. In this 
phenomenology and thanks to the discovery of 
concrete life-worlds, we will be able to consider 
phenomenology and philosophy as a basic 
science. In the field of mind and for ego, the 
natural world is discovered as an object. This ego 
can be a life-world for all similar egos, and all 
transcendental egos (transcendental we) can live 
there with peace. In this way, from each “other 
ego”, we reach another “other ego” such that 
“other ego” fills the gap and vacuum of the lonely 
ego and the intersubjective flow is formed in the 
meantime. The perception of this intersubjective 
relation is through a number of actions of which 
the person is aware. Thus, intersubjective 
relation becomes the fundamental dimension of 
human experiences. Among the issues following 
the intersubjective relation is the topic of “life-
world” since the congregation of monads and 
intersubjective relation does not occur in a 
vacuum but in the life-world. So, for the most 
primary intentional states to another creature, 
life-world is required because if ego wants to pay 
attention to other creatures, it needs a common 
environment between them. Husserl observes 
that the condition for the existence of 
intersubjective relation is the presence of a 
common life-world. Life-world always correlates 
with the perception of harmonious experience of 
intersubjective intentionality. Life-world is the 
area in which we live; a world that has physical, 
political, mythological and moral characteristics 
and dimensions. Based on the foregoing, it seems 
that Husserl has obviously been influenced by 
René Descartes' thoughts in describing and 
outlining his views. Therefore, the aim of this 
study is to answer the question as to what the 
most important Cartesian meditations in 
Husserl's philosophical thought are. The research 
method is comparative-analytical. Although a 
great deal of research has been conducted on 
Husserl's philosophy, an independent study that 
has expounded Husserl's influence from 
Descartes was not observed. This adds to the 
innovative aspect of the present research. 
 
Transcendental ego (subject) 
 
If we look for truth in Husserlian thinking, 
that truth cannot be found elsewhere except in 
ourselves. Thus, truth and criterion for truth is 
nothing but the transcendental ego which the 
profitability of every other thing even the world 
lies in its conscious life. Thus, ego is always raised 
as the identical pole of lived matters of self. This 
indicates the eternal correlation of cogito and 
objects of its thought; the cogito that, like Monad 
Leibniz, engages in constituting self and affairs, 
with the difference that these monads are open 
to the world and constitute the affairs in the 
intersubjective relation and life-world. 
Transcendental and monad-like ego reveals, 
opens and constitutes its horizons and realms in 
its eidetic scope after the transcendental 
reduction. So, phenomenology will not be 
anything except “clarifying the general essence of 
transcendental ego” (Husserl, 2002: 122). As a 
result, everything that is valid for human ego has 
validity and reliability inside the conscious life of 
ego and this ego does not go out of self in its 
awareness of the world and in all its scientific 
activities. “Any proof and any justification of the 
truth and existence are totally done in ego and 
the result is an attribute in the object of the ego’s 
I think” (ibid.: 135). Husserl comes to the 
conclusion that there is always a thought about 
something and the consciousness that has 
tendency towards a direction; this is 
intentionality.  With this assumption, Husserl’s 
theory of intentionality can be assumed as an 
attempt to solve the problem of our knowledge 
of the external world through proving how 
mental acts can turn into physical objects and 
natural states of affairs (Smith & McIntyre, 1982: 
87). 
 
The semantic essence of action is its 
intentional essence. However, it seems that the 
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theory of intentionality is intended to explain 
how a mental action can possess an intentional 
attribute (or a tendency to the object). This 
theory is completely general since it is applied to 
every intentional action of any kind. Therefore, 
“having a tendency to the object” is the inherent 
attribute of actions and this relation is a significant 
intentional relationship. “How the intentional 
essence of the intuitive action matches or goes to 
the semantic essence of the significant action?” 
(Husserl, 2002b: 719). 
 
Merleau-Ponty also seeks to prove that 
externality of the world as a matter isolated from 
the conscious ego does not exist. Hence, the 
Cartesian duality problem and Kantian thing-in-
itself are dissolved in Husserlian transcendental 
phenomenology and these are due to the 
intentionality of the transcendental ego. From 
the description by Merleau-Ponty about 
Husserl’s phenomenology, it can be concluded 
that: 
 
“Late in Husserl's life, phenomenon gradually 
assumes an ontological role like openness of the 
world to transcendental consciousness so that 
this world is common for all and is an integrated 
unit in which the perspectives of all people blend 
together. For this reason, Husserl's 
phenomenology is transcendental idealism” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002: XXI). 
 
Reduction of a theory is not a claim but is an 
action to be done and, in its pure form, is not an 
indicative sentence but is an imperative 
sentence. Talking about transcendental 
reduction or phenomenology in a singular tense 
is a little misleading because Husserl often speaks 
as if they are more than one. For example, in 
Ideas, Husserl distinguishes between 
philosophical reductions and natural, subjective, 
logical and material sciences such as geometry 
(Husserl, 1970a: 150). For Husserl, 
transcendental reduction is the same as “placing 
in parentheses” and, as mentioned in Ideas, this 
means that “although what exists in self remains, 
we “disable” it, “lay it aside” and “put it in 
parentheses”. It is still there because there is a 
matter within a pair of parentheses… but we do 
not apply it (ibid, 2002b: 111). In this way, “ego 
obtains something that is its own pure life with all 
pure subjective processes constituting it along 
with whatever exists purely as they are intended; 
that is, the world of phenomena” (Ibid, 1982: 
20). What remains with the phenomenological 
reduction is the transcendental ego; that is, the 
Greek principle and fundamental element of 
philosophy; the transcendental ego that is 
constantly grappling with its objects; the ego that 
has always aimed at its own objects. The main 
attribute of the Husserlian phenomena is the 
intentionality that is constituted in a noetic 
(application of thought)-noematic (what is 
thought in the application of thought) 
correlation. In this way, consciousness which is 
always aware of something includes 
consciousness carrying Ego Cogito Cogitatum (I 
think an object). Husserl states that if we have a 
conception of Jupiter, this God is the object of 
my imagination. He is present in my act in an 
immanent way and has subjectivity in that 
existence. I think of Jupiter as I think of Bismarck. 
I think of the Babylon tower as I think the 
Cologne church (ibid., 2002b: 558-560). 
 
One can summarize all Husserl's 
phenomenology to this two-sided correlation 
through a general approach; a relationship that 
only occurs in the mind. Thus, seeing something 
like a tree is not just for its external reality but is 
because it has been intended in the conscience. 
Any consciousness is always consciousness about 
something and each thought has always aimed at 
its noemata. In eidetic intuition, we meet directly 
with the objects; that is, the noumenon which 
could not be achieved within the limits of the 
Kantian theoretical intellect since the field of 
cognition for Kant was just phenomenon. 
Consequently, in Husserl’s opinion, “what 
provides the final basis is the essential insight not 
experience” (ibid., 2002a: 62). Reduction does 
not mean the sophistication of the world or real 
doubt about the world, but it merely means the 
refusal to make any prejudgment. With such 
reduction about the existence of the natural 
world, Husserl takes the most important 
phenomenological step. He says: “The 
phenomenological reduction is an act that 
absolutely prevents me from any judgment about 
time-space existence” (ibid., 1982: 55). Then, he 
mentions that: 
 
“I briefly say that a much shorter way to 
transcendental reduction in ideas, which I call 
Cartesian way, has a big flaw. While it reaches 
the transcendental ego with a leap, it manifests 
this ego as something apparently empty of 
content” (ibid., 1970a: 155). 
 
Although Descartes has made no mention of 
the field of consciousness after the discovery of 
“I think, so I am”, it can practically be said that 
even with a phenomenological approach, he has 
reached this ego and all other things that are 
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proved, such as God and the essential difference 
between the soul and the body, are the affairs 
occurring in the field of consciousness. From the 
Cartesian perspective, thought has all levels of 
conscience, like imagination, doubt, 
remembrance and idea, within it. Husserl argues 
that the main problem of modern philosophy is 
the opposition of the world between the subject 
and object. In his view, it should be noted in the 
first step that instead of “I think”, Descartes 
should say “Ego Cogito Cogitatum” (I think an 
object); I am a thinker who thinks about 
noemata. After discovering the intentional 
consciousness, Husserl attempted to transit from 
an assertoric to apodictic evidence. In this 
apodictic evidence, we find out that the whole 
world has been reduced to the consciousness of 
the ego and it is us who have acquired the world 
as a phenomenon for ourselves. Husserl seeks to 
link consciousness and the world. In this way, the 
world is our world and this is us who are the 
condition for the emergence of the world; a 
world that we find in our self by intuition; a world 
that remains with us after reduction (epoche).  
 
As mentioned by Merleau-Ponty (1995), 
phenomenology states that consciousness is an 
intermediary and its mediation which is done 
with the aid of its intentionality completely 
changes the issue of duality and our common 
understanding of perception (Merleau-Ponty, 
1995: 160). 
 
In his book called “Empirical Psychology”, 
Brentano (1874) believed that all psychological 
actions act directionally: “The feature of every 
subjective phenomenan can be called the 
reference to the content or orientation toward 
the object or immanent objectivity” (Brentano, 
1995: 88). This is a stage that is not merely 
perception for Husserl, but “perception is 
perception”. Hence, Husserl seeks to remove 
the gap between subject and object, which 
seemed impossible before him. 
 
Husserl observes that the realm of 
transcendental consciousness in a completely 
definite sense is the realm of “absolute” 
existence. This main category of existence is in 
the same way… in which the root of all other 
realms of existence has been put (Husserl, 
2002a: 212). Nevertheless, one of the results of 
Husserl’s orientation was the displacement of 
epistemological and ontological theories. This 
displacement became possible only by 
transcendental reduction. “So, 
phenomenological reductions seek to split 
themselves” (Ibid, 1985: 15) and from this split, 
“an ego is obtained because the observer 
impartial to the objects of his intentional self is 
not naïve” (Ibid, 1982: 35); the ego that is the 
absolute world of self-knowledge. This ego is a 
transcendental and absolute ego that is the 
suitable subject of phenomenological study and 
not a natural ego that is the subject of empirical 
knowledge of psychology. “If the transcendental 
object is the world of possible meanings, then 
outside it is absolutely meaningless” (ibid: 84). 
However, we are faced with a world that is 
placed in the concrete content of subjective life 
and in the flood of the mind. This world is not a 
natural world to which we gain access in a natural 
approach but is a transcendental world in the 
consciousness of the transcendental ego. 
 
This world has been enacted as a real and 
transcendental existence by ego. Jean-François 
Lyotard believes that any object for the 
consciousness of ego is nothing but something 
passive (object) for the consciousness of ego. 
Husserl uses the term "object" in the widest 
possible sense; a sense in which everything is 
object, whether it is an action or a state of affairs 
or an attribute or a material issue or a moment. 
Further, Husserl makes another distinction 
between physical and mental objects. He has 
inherited this distinction from Brentano with the 
least modification. Object is everything with 
intentional content, and object meaning a 
physical phenomenon is simpler than mental 
object (ibid., 2002b: 868). Subjective action is 
always an intentional phenomenon (Ibid: 556). In 
the meantime, a distinction should be made 
between meaning and meaningful action or 
between meaning intention and meaning 
fulfillment.  
 
For Husserl, the meaning of objects appears 
not as an abstract thing but as concrete 
consciousness and thus, a form of these objects 
comes to us that appears in our mind. Husserl 
considers these objects as eidetic not external 
and physical objects. He believes that we are 
associated with the objects that are present 
before us concretely. Objectivity is always for the 
subject. He considers all objects to be really 
object as far as they are object for the subject and 
anything other than this (apart from the 
conscious subject) is meaningless (Smith, 2003: 
33). Everything finds meaning in the light of 
conscious ego and not only the material nature 
but also the concrete life-world around us is a 
phenomenon for ego (ibid: 36). Husserl no 
longer needs to assume the self as an immaterial 
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essence and thought for proving the world. 
Perhaps, the main purpose of reduction is to 
merely remind man of the relationship between 
his conscience and the discovery of noemata that 
come in conscience. In a sense, we are more than 
what we are. The world is the amount that is 
correlated to our existence. As a result, we are 
responsible for the world and the world 
becomes dependent on the objects that we have 
selected for ourselves. So, things and affairs of 
the world will never be known to us per se unless 
they become the object of our conscience. 
Husserl's transcendental idealism passes through 
this phenomenology since in phenomenological 
reduction, the first and last words are given by 
meaning. With this authenticity of meaning, a 
new realm of existing is opened to us which 
includes intentional existence; that is, it is me 
who can understand the world in my favor. The 
meaning of all kinds of eidos (material, formal, 
concrete and abstract) is formed in the light of 
transcendental ego since it is me who 
understands the eidos  by intuition. Intuition is 
the same as the fulfillment of intention, i.e. 
leading to a type of intention correlated with 
intuition. The whole world is understood at the 
time of coincidence of this correlation. Hence, 
for its intuition, we need a departure for the 
world of meaning; a departure whose aim is to 
meet the eidos of affairs. Therefore, the veils 
should be removed so that according to 
Heidegger, the truth also comes to us. Truth in 
the world of phenomenon is found in the 
concrete world of transcendental ego. Thus, 
there is no longer a need for ascension to 
another world. Phenomenology never confines 
itself to fixed facts but is always like a new start 
for fresh and fresher discoveries. 
 
Intersubjective relation 
 
Husserl is looking for a kind of consciousness 
as an inner experience. However, Husserl’s inner 
experience of consciousness is not a 
psychological issue but is a phenomenological 
and philosophical issue. So, he is in search of a 
rational and not objective and natural 
phenomenon (Moran & Mooney, 2002: 78). In 
this field, we deal with a dual intention between 
consciousness and its objects which are 
subjective correlations; that is, everything 
conceived in our mind is important. We will 
always see the intention of this dual 
correspondence in practice, meaning that we are 
faced with a mind with a fluid life, i.e. with a 
phenomenological, antecedent and essential 
form. For Husserl, such a correlational 
relationship between object and subject is an 
immanent relation, meaning these two correlate 
to the existence of each other. Hence, the object 
of consciousness is a matter that is dissolved in 
the mind of the transcendental immanent ego 
and consequently, we never face noemata like 
objective and actual objects since the flow inside 
us is always immanent which occurs in the mind 
of the thinking ego (ibid: 138-139). What is 
formed in the light of this relation is indeed the 
transition to a superior form of consciousness. In 
this way, we enter a subjective and concrete flow 
of consciousness and through these 
relationships, we can hope to reach an eidetic 
intuition. Ego as a thinking being is faced with a 
group of noemata which are inseparable part of 
ego. Besides, after these affairs became known 
to ego, a distinct understanding of other ego is 
achieved, which is caused by the real expansion 
of the concept of internal experience of ego. I 
find others in the intersubjective realm and pure 
life of my consciousness. This is a process in 
which one can hope the achievement of eidetic 
science. The first individual who could make a 
transcendental turn in this meaning was 
Descartes as the purpose of his meditations was 
to achieve the first philosophy, which is the same 
thing that Husserl was looking for. But Husserl 
analyzed this Cartesian transcendental turn 
through phenomenological and transcendental 
reduction in order to pass the duality created for 
Descartes because Husserl's self is no longer a 
thinking and lonely essence but is a 
psychosomatic ego. 
 
Husserl believes that fact and essence cannot 
be separated since the concept of phenomenon 
in its broad area embraces all of them in a united 
meaning. From Husserl’s view, essence and 
eidos of all affairs is thought. It is due to this 
thought that we can understand the eidetic 
intuition of affairs in their pure state like 
phenomenology in itself. For Husserl, 
achievement of the existence of a concrete eidos 
is important (Husserl, 2002a: 52-60). This ego as 
an ego-subject recognizes the core of the natural 
world as the subjective object. From the view of 
this ego, life-world is considered in an 
intersubjective relation for all egos similar to this 
ego such that all transcendental egos 
(transcendental we) live in it with peace (ibid: 
103-119). All of these objects even external 
objects are in a subjective relation to the 
transcendental ego. Thus, subject and objects 
find meaning in a correlational unity with each 
other. Ego is like a communication center for all 
lived matters in the consciousness of ego and all 
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lived matters find meaning in relation to this 
transcendental ego. Transcendental ego is not an 
object but a correlation for objects, which 
encompasses all of them in its transcendental 
scope. As a result, everything outside this 
relation is meaningless (ibid, 2002b: 83-92). 
Husserl's growing interest in constituting affairs 
due to the cooperation of intersubjective relation 
and fundamental reduction of things is an issue 
that cannot be ignored. In his viewpoint, 
transcendental reduction ultimately brings us to 
transcendental-intersubjective phenomenology 
(Husserliana LXP, 2002: 245). This relation is a 
point of departure towards opening new 
horizons of experiences of consciousness. In this 
way, the opening of new horizons occurs in the 
light of the relation between ego and other ego 
in an intersubjective world; an issue whose 
realization is in a concrete and antecedent 
structure. In Husserl’s analysis of the intentional 
structure, experience becomes evident. 
Intentionality plays a crucial role in opening new 
horizons of thinking since in every moment, with 
the realization of intentionality, a new horizon 
can be witnessed. This means that a new object 
is added to consciousness (Dan, 1997: 1). 
Husserl sees the characteristic of each horizon to 
be its potential talent in possible perceptions and 
correlation of ego, i.e. opting an absent feature 
that is in correlation with the perceptions of ego 
(ibid: 2). It is understood from analyzing the 
nature of the horizon that this is completely 
dependent on multiple intentional perceptions of 
subjects and in this way provides us with multiple 
possibilities as Husserl also refers to the term 
“open intersubjectivity” (ibid: 3). This mutual 
relationship between subjects is possible only in 
the world and through unanimity, i.e. when every 
“other ego” and its body are viewed as ego 
(subject) and its body. Here, I (conscious subject) 
perceive the relation between the self and the 
world    through self-consciousness and with the 
help of unanimity and consider other ego like 
ego, i.e. a subject that makes the world its object 
(Smith, 2003: 243). 
 
According to Husserl, objects of the world 
can be revealed through the eidetic feature of 
phenomenology; that is, eidos can be observed 
and in this way, we can witness the possibility of 
the presence of transcendental-eidetic 
phenomenology (ibid: 137). In the eidetic order, 
we deal with a new kind of intuition and object 
in a higher order. Husserl often states that the 
possibility of seeing eidos is in the reference to 
such a free variation (ibid: 138). Husserl tries to 
transit from the intersubjective relation of 
subjects to a transcendental philosophy; a 
philosophy in which no matters have been 
isolated but self-consciousness has a social 
language and intersubjective relation which 
constitute any reality. 
 
From Husserl's point of view, the simplest 
way to explain the intersubjective relation is the 
concept of life-world. In this respect, he has used 
the term “social entities”. In his opinion, all 
subjects in life-world have a general experience. 
He explicitly states that: 
 
“The transcendental intersubjective relation 
is the absolute ground of existence (Seinboden) 
from which the relation and meaning of 
everything originate… Development of 
phenomenology is necessarily a transition from 
the egologic stage to transcendental-sociological 
phenomenology” (Dan, 1997: 1). 
In this way, Husserl’s attention is fully paid to 
the transcendental intersubjective relation. He 
claims that objectivity and transcendence of the 
universe constitute the intersubjective relation 
and the clarity of this constitution requires the 
analysis of the transcendental and intersubjective 
relation, i.e. more concrete study of the 
experience of consciousness fluid life of subjects. 
Accordingly, transcendental ego can constitute 
the world only after the experience of others 
(ibid: 2). 
 
Life-world 
 
After the meaning of intersubjective relation 
became clear, the existence of a common world 
among egos is concurrently explained. This 
means that when ego finds out something other 
than body and consciousness, intentional objects 
and phenomenal device of ego, ego should 
simultaneously reside in the same environment. 
Moreover, ego understands that other egos are 
conscious like ego. So, such a life-world is 
created from the intentional and intersubjective 
experiences among such egos. In this way, the 
life-world is transformed into a world that is 
raised among the common meanings of a group 
of egos. After achieving the transcendental ego, 
Husserl came to the point that it is time for this 
transcendental subject to go from an individual 
stage to a collective stage and this is realized in 
the intersubjective relation, but all of these 
events occur in a world that is the place of living 
experience of egos; a world that is nothing but 
life-world. Therefore, discovery of life-world is a 
tendency to find the absolute truth. In other 
words, truth is the presence and evidence in the 
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living experience of this moment, and renewal 
exists in the next moments. 
 
Husserl agree with Cartesian lonely ego as far 
as there is no mention of understanding other 
ego. But to prove the intersubjective relation and 
life-world and not to get caught in the close circle 
of the lonely ego, it seems that he has to 
acknowledge the presence of the body. Even the 
first presence of any other phenomenon along 
with the consciousness of ego becomes the 
presence of another body. However, this body is 
not any body but a body that is called “lived 
body” by Husserl. Human body is a body that is 
totally conscious and the body movement is full 
of mind. 
 
Life-world is an experience that is obtained 
without voluntary thinking and without resorting 
to classification or conceptualization and usually 
consists of those things that are considered to be 
obvious or common (Husserl, 1970b: 9). 
Phenomenology is basically the study of lived 
experience or life-world (Van Manen, 1997: 9). 
Phenomenology in the world is lived by one 
person not a world or fact that is separate from 
human (Valle et al., 1989: 55). Now, we are faced 
with a world that is not my world but “our 
world” (Husserl, 1970a: 108) and “the 
transcendental ego is replaced by the 
transcendental we” (ibid: 172). It can be stated 
that evolved phenomenology eventually moves 
from “the lonely transcendental ego to an 
intersubjective and transcendental relation” (Van 
Manen, 1997: 9). In other words:  
 
“Life-world is now and always present for us 
who live in it with wakefulness. It has already 
existed for us and forms the ground for all 
theoretical or extra theoretical actions… Living 
always includes life in a world of certainty. 
Wakeful life is wakefulness in the world… Each 
of them is something; “something from” a world 
of which we are constantly aware as a horizon… 
Ego constitutes this special eidos (essence) in 
itself, “others”, “objectivity” and generally 
whatever has existential validity for ego in ego as 
non-ego” (Husserl, 1970a: 142-143). 
 
In this way, thanks to the relation 
intersubjectively and transcendentally created, 
we will witness a life-world of humans who 
constitute the “transcendental we”. 
 
Husserl had considered the concept of life-
world as a final introduction to the 
phenomenological transcendental structure. In 
the book called “Crisis of European Sciences”, he 
argues that the concept of life has an absolute 
value; an issue that is realized in spiritual life-
world. Further, he regards phenomenology as a 
universal self-consciousness of human behavior. 
He demands an ultimate science behind 
phenomenology; a science that can be the 
ground for all human achievements in life-world 
(Carles, 2009: 68-69). 
 
Conclusion 
 
1- Husserl has obtained the first principle and 
true knowledge in examining the transcendental 
thinking. Unlike other academic sciences, he 
does not try to base the foundation of his desired 
science on the raw material of real and possible 
affairs or preliminary beliefs and prejudgments. 
 
2- By such meditations, Husserl looks for the 
initial, fundamental, essential and unquestionable 
philosophy and an applied method; a method 
that begins with “I think” as an indubitable 
principle. In this way, phenomenology deals with 
antecedent rules, i.e. return to a transcendental 
subject that embraces the entire world as an 
object. 
 
3- Transcendental phenomenology is a new 
science that covers a new ground of experience. 
With transcendental experiences, abilities and 
actions create an independent realm of direct 
experience. 
 
4- Advanced phenomenology which has been 
organized needs no antecedent science; but 
ideally, it has all imaginable previous sciences and 
in fact absolutely creates the philosophy of 
sciences. 
 
5- Transcendental phenomenology is 
considered as the first philosophy and the 
method of all secondary philosophies and finally, 
it is for a general philosophy in the traditional 
sense. Hence, this science cannot be dependent 
on sciences and cannot exist as secondary to 
them. 
 
6- Husserl introduces phenomenology as a 
method by the instrumental and applied use of 
concepts and terms and extends its scope 
beyond a type of mere epistemology. With these 
explanations, idealism of transcendental 
phenomenology is a theory that is considered as 
a concrete science in specific verifiable areas. 
Indeed, Husserl displays for us an image the use 
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of which is possible in all epistemological 
spheres. 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. Merleau-Ponty is one of the students and 
listeners of the lesson “Husserl's speeches” in 
Sorbonne (1929) called Cartesian meditations. 
He even considers as extremely important the 
sixth meditation which has not been published.  
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